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Introduction,
"A Road to India.'" This slogan haa often aroused the Suro-
paana to supreme efforts. Alexander of Macedon, with dauntless
courage, opened the way in ancient tiirtes, yet it was not until the be-
ginning of the ffiCLdern era that men were actually able to follow.
However, from the days when Columbus ventured forth on an unknown sea,
until the present time when we see the Germans ambitious to extend
1
their control as far as India, all European nations having great com-
mercial interests, have vied with each other, not only to control a
highway thither, but also to possess this land which Nature has so
uniquely endowed.
Three well-known highways, leading directly from Europe to
India, seem to have been laid out naturally, one via Suezand the Red
Sea, a second over the ancient road through Aleppo, Bagdad and the
Persian Gulf, and a third from the Caspian across Turkestan and Af-
ghanistan. Many accounts have been written concerning the keen rival-
ry that has developed between Russia and Great Britain since the mid-
dle of the nineteenth century, to control all or even one of these
routes, a r ivalry checked only by the preparation for the present
3 3
World War. These writers use various dates , including 1839, 1853,
and 1864, as the time of the beginning of the real struggle. However,
long before the earliest date, both of these countries were strong
Empires and had long held Asiatic possessions. Moreover, in European
1. Count Reventlow in "Deutschlands Auswftrtige Politik" (3rd Edition^
p. 340). Reference in S.S. Mc Clure's "Obstaoles to Peace", 31.
3. Osborn, R.D., "The Russians and English in Central Asia", Nation
vol.40, p. 358. 4.
3. Rawlinson, H.C., "Russian Advance in Central Asia", Nineteenth
Century, Vol. 17, pp.557 ff.
4. Varabery, A., "Will Russia Conquer Indiar" Ibid.^p.Sb.
Foulke, W.D. , "Slav or Saxon", p. 49.

politics we find a long list of events in which the Anglo-Saxons
5
and the Slavs were on opposite sides. The question arises as to how
far this rivalry existed in connection with their Asiatic interests,
and its investigation down to the beginning of the Crimean War is
the purpose of this Study.
5. Urquhart, David, "Diplomatic Transactions in Asia", 39.
I
Chapter I.
THE RUSSIANS AND ENGLISH IN ASIA BEFORE 1S80.
The early Russians and English were alike in that both had com-
mercial instincts and also individual ambition. Yet as to race,
religion, mode of thot , and form of government they were natural
opponents. 1 Another contrast was in the geographical endowments of
their countries. Russia's area was much more extensive, which tend-
ed to keep her population scattered. Again, the lack of seaports
that were not blocked in winter, or under the military control of
some other nation, served as a great handicap. Krausse says; "This
want of seaboard forms a very prominent factor in Russian history
and is largely responsible for the dearth of intercourse between
Russia andother nations, with its accompaniment of lack of prog-
ress, as well as serving as an incentive to the constant seizure of
new territory with the view of practically working a way toward a
maritime outlet which will serve to put the country on a parity
2
with other nations."
A glance at the map will show that Russia belongs geographical-
ly to Asia, the only real barrier being the Caucasus mountains. The
rivers flow southward and eastward so that it is not strange that
the people with their nomadic instincts naturally drifted from the
ice-bound coasts toward sunnier climes.
Very soon after the Russians were freed from the fear of Mongol
domination in the latter half of the fifteenth century, they began
to look toward Asia. During the reign of Vassilli III (1505-1533)
1. Krausse, Alexis, "Russia in Asia" 898
2. Ibid. , 3

3.
a pillaging race of Cossacks annexed the Western Urals. Part of
this range is so low-lying that soon many raiders crossed to attack
the Asiatics. The first marked success was in 1581, when Strogo-
noff, who was sent by Ivan the Terrible to search for gold, took
3
Sibir, the capital of Kirghiz, with the help of these Cossacks.
Meantime some farming folk were pushing down the Volga in search of
new lands. The Tsar supported them with his array and in 1552 Kazan
4
was taken and soon the Russian forces were in Astrakhan.
These victories led the Russian traders to push on and on, en-
during many hardships as they traversed the Siberian steppes or
made their way from oasis to oasis in Central Asia. In 1587 Tobolsk
was founded, in 1604 Tomsk marked their progress, and by 1638 some
5
had pushed on to Okhotsk. This advance was not unopposed. Especial-
ly were the Chinese alarmed, for they claimed the suzerainty of that
section. In 1684 they demanded immediate evacuation, but the Rus-
sians decided to try to defend their holdings. However, in 1689
the Tsar sent representative to fix the boundaries by a formal
6
treaty. This treaty of Nerchinsk shut off Russia from the Pacific
for over a century and marks one of the few instances when Muscovy
7
gave up foreign territory she had once occupied.
About the same time the Cossacks made a desperate effort to in-
stigate trade relations with the Khivans in Central Asia but due to
the strength of the latter and the unfavorable clittatic conditions
8
this was, for a time, a failure.
3. Skrine, F.H.R. and Ross, E.D, , "The Heart of Asia." 338.
4. ibid. , 236.
5. Krausse, Alexis, "Russia in Asia." 333.
6. Ibid.
, 34, 37, 40.
7. Ibid. , 41. For text of this treaty see Appendix 330-331.
8. Ibid. , 55.

3.
In 1689, Russia came under the rule of that ambitious Tssu who
wished to extend its influence both east and west. Rumors of the
wealth of Asia led Peter the Great to send envoys in 1715 to find
which rivers flowed into the Caspian, by which they could get to the
sea, and whether any rivers rising in India flowed into the sea.
They concluded that the Oxus formerly flowed into the Caspian and
planned to restore its course so that they could get to Khiva by
boat from Astrakhan. To do this Prince Bekovitch was sent, but he
allowed the Khan of Khiva to deceive him and the whole army was
9
either killed or enslaved.
In his designs on the regions west of the Caspian, Peter had
better success. In 1732 by demanding compensations from the Shah
of Persia because Russian merchants had been robbed, he made a
"pretext for war to sieze Derbend, and himself commanded the expe-
dition which descended the Volga." The result was that the Rus-
sians occupied Derbend and Baku and took possession of Daghestan
and other provinces of the Caucasus. Ten years later Persia re-
gained these provinces for a time but this did not quiet Russiatn
ambition.
During the remainder of the eighteenth century the Muscovites
were almost wholly engrossed in either European conflicts or domes-
tic problems. Only in the reign of Catherine II do we find any
trace of Asiatic designs. It is related that when the commerce of
Bengal was disturbed by the advance of Hyder Ali beyond the Orixa,
9. Ibid., 56-59. An Indian Officer, "Russia's March Toward India."
Vol. I, 39-31.
10. Rambaud, Alfred, "The History of Russia." Vol.11, 57.
An Indian Officer, "Russia's March Toward India." I, 31-33.
11. Ibid. , 36.
During the rest of the century Georgia is alternately controll-
ed by Russia dnd Persia. In 1800 under the latter. Ibid. ,44-49.
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some merchants from that country went to Siberia seeking new mar-
kets. Here they came in contact with some Russians who learned from
them of the wealth of India. Consequently in 1783 an exj^edition
was sent down the Caspian with the hope of reaching that country.
The account further states that altho this attempt failed the plan
12
was not abandoned.
Then in the latter part of her reign, Catherine sent an army
of about 40,000 men to avenge the loss of her subjects in Georgia.
They overran the region south of the Caspian and camped for the win-
ter on the plains of Mogsun. Catherine's death in the midst of these
ambitions defeated this plan also, for her successor immediately
recalled the army from Persia. •^'^
While the Slavs were making these invasions into northern and
western Asia, we find that the Anglo-Saxons were getting a hold in
the southern part. Like the other peoples of Europe who bought
goods from India, the English were not satisfied to stay at the
"Western terminals." Therefore in the sixteenth century we find
them endeavoring to establish their own trade routes.
Whatever may be said of Anglo-Russian rivalry later, in the mid-
dle of the sixteenth century the leaders of the British-Muscovy
Company bound for India went via Russia with not only the Tsar's
permission but with his "safe-conduct" for the journey to Central
Asia. Of these Jenkinson went the farthest, but his limits were
Bokhara in 1558, and Kasvin in 1553. His turning back was due to
14disappointment in the trade profits in those cities, India was to
be reached by a different route and at a later time.
12. Mirabeau's "Histoire Secrete De La Cour De Berlin."
Letter XXIX, 95.
13. Quarterly Review. Vol. 15, 273.
14. Hakluyt's Voyages, li , 449 ff.

5.
Not until 1579 did the first Englishman, Thomas Stephens, ar-
rive in India. Then by 1600, the East India Company, rounding the
Cape, began its well kno'.vn career of commerce and conquest. In
1613 they secured their first settlement on the mainland of India
at Surat. By driving out the Portuguese who had been there a cen-
tury before and by contending with the French who came just a few
years after them, as well as by subduing the natives, the English
trade and control gradually developed. In 1690, they held the
three important ports of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay. In 1745,
the rivalry with the French developed into a war. The decisive
battle fought by Clive at Plassey, June 33, 1757, is said to mark
the beginning of the British Empire in the East. In 1774 Warren
Hastings, as the first governor-general, began to organize the em-
pire Clive had founded. "In 1798, Lord Mornington, better known
as the Marquis Wellssley, arrived in India, already inspired with
imperial projects that were destined to change the map of the
country. From the first he laid do^im as his guiding principle that
the British must be the one parEiraount power in the peninsula and
that the native princes could only retain the insignia of sovereign-
ty by surrendering the substance of independence.
"
Thus before 1800 both the Russians and the British were endeav-
oring to extend their trade facilities by getting footholds in the
eastern continent. Yet miles and miles of deserts interspersed
with oases and mountains so separated the two sections that there
was little real concern on the part of either over the advance of
the other.
5. This survey of the British in India before 1800 is based on
W. W. Hunter's account in the Encyclopedia Britannica. Eleventh
Edition.

Chapter II.
ENGLAND AND RUSSIA IN THE NAPOLEONIC PERIOD
The dawn of the nineteenth century found Europe in a state of
wonder and alarm over the activities of Napoleon Bonaparte. After
a brilliant campaign in Italy, he had conquered Egypt, and in 1799
advanced into Syria, seeming to intend to make his way to India.
Here how^.ver, he was checked by the British and the Turks and pres-
1
ently went back to France, leaving his army in Egypt. The extent
of Europeaji concern is seen in the unusual alliance of Russia. Tur-
key, England, and Austria, made against the powerful leader.
2
Plans were laid to surround France with their forces but soon Paul
3
became disgusted with his treatment both by Austria and by England.
Mapoleon took advantage of this by using measures to widen the
breach. First, when the English refused to exchange French for
Hussian prisoners, Napoleon sent the Russians back to Paul, newly
clothed and armed, without exchange, and second, he offered to rec-
4
ognize Paul as "Grand Master " in Malta. The Tsar, moreover, "with
his usual impetuosity, was possessed by a daily increasing passion
for Bonaparte; he surrounded himself with his portraits, drank his
5
health publicly, and abruptly ordered Louis Xviii to quit Mittau.
»
6
Among the schemes of this new alliance in 1800, we find evi-
1. MaJtinsau, Harriet, "The History of England", I, 17.
2. Rambaud, Alfred, "History of Russia"^ II, 187.
3. Ibid., 197. Austria had failed to aid the Russian general, and
the English who were about to take the island of Malta, where
Paul claimed rights, said they were going to keep it.
4. Ibid.
5. ibid., 198. Paul had 2:iven Louis Xvlli an asylum at Mittau, 187.
6. Waliszewski, in his "Life of Paul i, " 369-371, states that while
there may have been secret communications between Paul and Napo-
leon, he can find no documents in the archives to prove that
the two "concerted an expedition against India." Yet in referr-
ing to Paul he "rrites: "IJO doubt he decreed and put in execution
an expedition to India;" sind concerning his ally; "Bonaparte
certainly had such an expedition in his mind and did not require
Paul's suggestion."
I«
7.
dence of one to overthrow tiie british in India. As the French
still occupied Egypt and were influential in several Indian states
the time seemed favorable. The plan, which appears to have been
made entirely by Paul, provided that a Russian array should go via
Khiva and Bokhara to the Upper Indus, and that another made up of
i-Tench and Russians should go thru Persia via Herat and Kandahar.
When instructing his officers, Paul said: "India, to which I send
you, is governed by a supreme head called the Great Mogul, and a
number of small sovereigns. The English posaess commercial estab-
lishments there, which they have acquired by means of money or con-
quered by force of arms; my object is to ruin these establishments,
and to put the oppressed sovereigns in the same state of dependence
on Russia as they are at present towards England, Be sure to re-
member that you are only at war with the English and the friend of
7
all who do not give them help." When Napoleon questioned how the
troops were to cross the deserts of Asia, Paul replied that cara-
vans crossed every year in 35 or 40 days, and so could they, since
8
the men were so brave.
The Tsar endeavored to carry out his part of the plan by start-
ing off "despite the inclement season," an army of 40,000 men, and
making preparations for the joint army. The band of Cossacks had
only gone as far as the plains of Orenburg, when it was recalled
because of the assassination of the Tsar (March 23, 1801). Krausse
says: "Thus ended the first scheme for the invasion of India, one
which, while it was built up on supposition, and included many ab-
surdities, served nevertheless as the groundwork of all those which
7. Krausse, A., "Russia in Asia," 143-150.
8. Rambaud, "History of Russia," II, 303.

have followed it. "
Napoleon was greatly disappointed, and vainly tried to in-
sinuate that the English were responsible for the crime. The fact
was that Paul's fluctuating foreign policy was very unpopular with
10
his own subjects. One of the first acts of the new Emperor, Alex-
ander I, was to make peace with both England and France, for the
people were clamoring for the restoration of their commercial rela-
11
tions. But while such an aggressive leader as wapoleon was in
Europe the^e could be no peace. After an attempt to settle the
struggle at Amiens in 1803, it broke out again the next year. Much
as Alexander desired t>ea.ce, he entered the Third Coalition against
^japoleon in 1805, with the special agreement with England, arranged
by Pitt, whereby subsidies were promised to Russia by the British
1
3
Government, if she would put a certain number of men in the field.
Very soon Napoleon showed his favorite policy of cunningly mak-
ing separate agreements with his enemies. After his victory at
Friedland, June 14, 1807, over those Russians and Prussians he
"dazzled and flattered" Alexander until the latter consented to make
peace at the expense of England. The two men met on a rafx on the
Niemen river and made agreements which led to the Treaty of Tilsit,
13
July 7, 1807. This treaty shows that the Tsar consented to join Na-
14
poleon's "Continental system" directed expressly against England.
It is thot that a secret treaty was made at the same time whereby
the two Emperors arranged to divide the world, giving the West to
Napoleon and the East to Alexander. Bonaparte may have regarded
9. Krausse, "Russia in Asia," 151.
10. Morfill, W.K. , "History of Russ ia, 1689-1855" , 373.
11. ibid. , 376.
13. "Treaty of Concert between His Majesty and the Emperor ot Russia?
Annual Register^ 1805 , 658.
13. Brodrick and Pother ingham, "Political History of England"^ XI ,53.
14. Treaty at Tilsit-Annual Register, 1807, 730-734.
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much of this as only a scheme to bring the Tsax on his side, never-
the less, in his diary under the date of Feb. 3, 1808, he wrote ad-
dressing the Emperor of Russia: "General Savary has just arrived
and I have spent many hours with him talking about your Majesty.
"An axmy of 50,000 men, made up of Russians, of French, perhaps
even with a few Austrians marching by way of Conatantinople on
India, would no sooner reach the Euphrates than England would trem-
ble and be on her knees to the Continent . "^^But the campaigns in
Spain so absorbed Napoleon's attention that any designs he may have
had on India had to be dropped. '^
The first article of the secret treaty as later given out is:
"Russia shall take possession of European Turkey and shall extend
her conquests into Asia as far as she may deem proper. "17The Tsar
seemed to consider the agreement seriously and proceeded to act on
its authority. On Oct. 31, 1807, he issued a proclam.ation annull-
ing "forever, every preceding convention between England and Rus-
sia. There was much speculation in England as to the real projects
of Napoleon and Alexander, The Edinburgh Register announced the
possibility of a co-operative march thru Persia to strike a "mortal
blow" at the English in Hindustan.
Just what Alexander hoped to accomplish is hard to determine.
While no definite plan like Paul's is related, nevertheless we find
that the Russians were by no means inactive in Asia during the
Napoleonic Period. As has been already noted Alexander recalled
15. "The Corsican-A Diary of Napoleon's Life in His Own Words",
Edited by R.M.Johnston. 284.
16. Brodrick and Fother ingham, "Political History of England", XI , 59.
17. "Pretended Secret Treaty" in Schnitzler's "Secret History of
Russia under Alexander I and Nicholas I." I, App. , 398.
18. "Declaration of Emperor of Russia"-Annual Register, 1807, 751.
19. Vol. Impart 1,1808, 327.
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Paul's expedition, but his policy in Persia was one of aggression.
On Sept. 21, 1801, he issued a proclamation annexing Georgia to his
20dominions. A month later the English Ambassador at Constantinople
warned Mr. Harford Jones, the Ambassador at Teheran, that the Rus-
sian advance at t iflis and Kars seemed to be aimed against their
21interests in Persia. Also, on July 2, 1803, Mr. Jones wote to
22Lord Castlereagh that a report, generally accepted, indicated that
the Russians had taken Erivanand Nakitchevan.
Then on April 18, 1804, Mr. Manesty reported to Castlereagh
that "notwithstanding the late appearances at Paris and St. Peters-
burg", he believed there existed "some secret political connexion
between the Russian Emperor and the First Consul." He further
stated that it was his judgment that the Russian forces in Georgia
and Armenia could conquer all Persia. Then it would not be diffi-
cult to get control of Afghanistan's inefficient government and to
"penetrate the fertile regions of Hindostan. " In much this same
way the struggle between Russia and Persia dragged along until
1813, "attended with events in which the Asiatic inferiority in
military affairs has been conspicuous."^^
Meantime the situation had changed in Europe. In 1809, Napo-
leon called on Alexander to fight against the Austrians, which was
not to his liking. 26 Moreover, in that same year, still relying on
20. Krausse, A, "Russia in Asia", 110.
21. Correspondence and Despatches of Viscount Castlereasrh, Vol.V,
165.
22. Lord Castlereagh was Head of the Board of Control, 1802-1805,
and afterward served as Sec'y. of War and Colonies.
23. Ibid. , 179.
24. Ibid.
,
252-256. Mr. Manesty was in Persia under the command of
Wellesley.
25. Annual Register 1813, 198.
26. Skrine, F.H.
,
"Expansion of Russia", 22-23.
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the Tilsit Treaty, the Tsar had attempted to seize the Danubean
provinces of Turkey. This led to a war in which Napoleon not only
refused to help, but diplomatically hindered his former ally.^'''
This wax finally ended with the Treaty of Bucharest (May 38, 1812).
The gains that came to Russia from this agreement were due to
28
British and not to French diplomacy. These and other experiences
had shown Alexander that Bonaparte was only using him for his own
interests. Added to this was the dissatisfaction of the mercantile
classes of Russia because their trade had been cut off with Eng-
land. 22 So, once again, on Aug. 1, 1813, a treaty of alliance was
30
made between Russia and Great Britain.
This put the English in an awkward position in Persia, for they
had heeded the Shah's request to allow British officers to lead her
31troops against the Russians, who now were their allies. Conse-
quently Sir Gore Ou3dley»one of these officers, proceeded to act as
a mediator to arrange a Treaty. Russia's demands on Persia were so
great that only a Secret Article promising satisfaction would in-
32duce the Shah to sign. This Treaty, known as the Treaty of Gulis-
tan was concluded Oct. 12, 1613. By it Russia gained many rights,
including the holding of conquered territory and the exclusive
33
right to have war-ships on the Caspian Sea.
27. Ibid. , 21.
28. Urquhaxt, David, "Progress of Russia in West, North and South,"
293.
29. Skrine, F.H. , "The Expansion of Russia", 21.
30. Annual Register, 1812, 381.
31. Krausse, "Russia in Asia", 111.
32. "Letters and Despatches of Lord Castlereagh" X, 108.
33. State Papers-British and Foreign V, 1109-1113 (French)
Krausse, A., "Russia in Asia", App. 332-335 (Trans.)

13.
The activities of Napoleon so dominate the period 1800-1815
that other events are overshadowed. Neither England nor Russia
had much ener^-y to give to Asiatic affairs, yet their interests in
that continent were not forgotten. The Russians, in their non-
demonstrative way, so made their gains that few Englishmen, except
those on the ground, were alarmed. The people in England based
their views on the open plans of Bonaparte and Paul. Perhaps the
most radical of these were represented in the Quarterly Review,
which declared that these Emperors thot of striking the British in
India as a war-measure, hut on account of the English strength in
the East and the difficulties of the frontier countries, "no wise
government can ever meditate an e3q:edition to India for its own
sake."
'^^
34. Vol. XIX, 1818, 174.

Chapter III.
THE EASTERN QUESTION AND THE ASIATIC STRUGGLE 1815-1841,
The Treaty between Russiaaid Persia in 1813 marked the beginn-
ing of a period of several years in which there was corcpaxatively
little European strife in Central Asia. This was probably due, in
part at least, to the controversies in the Levant. The Napoleonic
wars had brought the Russians into contact with western civiliza-
tion, and 30 developed their foreign trade that the desire for com-
niercial highways was stronger than ever. Since her earliest days
Russia had longed to control the Straits to the Mediterranean and
her history includes almost a chain of conflicts over these with
her neighbor the Turk.
Since making the Treaty of Bucharest in 1813, both parties had
failed to keep some of their promises^: so another conflict was
pending. When, however, in 1821 the Greek patriots arose against
the Ottoman Empire, Alexander, influenced by Metternich, at first
2
offered to aid the Sultan. But it was not long until he repented.
Some atrocities of the Turks and the Russian sympathy for their co-
religionists, added to the traditional enmity, resulted in the
Tsar's sending an ultimatum to the Porte, in which he demanded a
number of privileges. To this the Sultan made no reply, so on
July 37, 1821, diplomatic relations were severed. War would have
resulted immediately had not Alexander realized that "he would be
opposed by Europe, which might unite to ^est Turkey from his
grasp. "^The most interested observer was England, whose ambassadors
used every effort to stay the Tsar's hand.
1 Skrine, F.H.
,
"Expansion of Russia," 51.
2 Ibid. , 68.
3 Ibid. , 69-70.
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February 17, 1826, Wellington wrote to Bathurst that from the
Greek insurrection there would probably come a "general war" in
which Ruasia and France would expect gaina. "I cannot understand",
he observed, "the meaning of the benefit which we are to derive
from the establishment in the Mediterranean of an efficient naval
Power which is likewise Continental. Can naval affairs in the
Mediterranean be better for us than they are? The Turks, powerless
in themselves, close that sea to all who might have the means or
Inclination of using it, and we are, in fact, the masters of its
navigation." Yet because he doubted Parliamentary support for
active hostility at that time, the Duke urged an attempt to arrange
a settlement between Greece and Turkey as the best solution of the
4
situation.
In keeping with this suggestion the new Emperor of Russia,
Nicholas I, departed from the resolution made by Alexander just
5
before his death in 1835 to declare war on Turkey, by making pro-
6
posals to Great Britain for "common action," The result was the
Treaty of London made by Great Britain, Russia, and France on July
6, 1827, whereby the three nations agreed to stand for the autonomy
7
of Greece within the Turkish Empire. A combined fleet was already
in the Levant and on Oct. 20th answered the Sultan's refusal , albeit
O
irregularly , with a defeat at Navarinc, which saved the Greeks.
4. Despatches and Correspondence, III, 113-115. Wellington was
then Envoy to St. Petersburg and Bathurst was Sec'y of War and
Colonies.
5. Skrine, "Expansion of Russia," 74.
6 . Ibid. , 99.
7. State Papers^XIV., 633ff; Annual Register, 1827
, 405;
"Map of Europe by Treaty"; Edited by Hertslet, I, 769-774.
8. Annual Register, 1827, 317,
II
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Meantime a war had developed in Asia, Russia's frontier,
though undefined, roughly followed the river Aras west of the Cas-
pian and a line from Astrakhan via Orenhiirg east along the southern
9
boundary of Siberia, The greatest advance in recent years had been
in the Caucasus and it ^vas there that the Shah claimed that the Rus-
sians occupied Persian territory. When Nicholas came to the throne
he tried to fix the boundary but Abbas Mirza, heir to the Persian
crown, played a double part with the Russian representative, Prince
Menzikoff. Relying on the discontent of Russia's new subjects and
the loyalty of all Mohammedans, he invited revolts while pretending
to negotiate. Therefore on Sept. 38, 1826, when Menzikoff per-
10
ceived the real situation, Russia issued a declaration of war.
Another resource on which the Persians had depended was help
from the British. On Nov, 35, 1814, a "Treaty of Friendship and
Alliance" had been signed at Teheran, by which, if a European Power
were at war with Persia, the English were to use their "good office^
to bring peace, or if this failed, to help with arms or with a sub-
11
sidy. Yet when the appeal for aid reached England the ministers
were greatly puzzled. On Nov. 31, 1836, Wellington wrote to Cann-
ing: "I have perused the papers in the box regarding the dispute
between the Emperor of Russia and the King of Persia and it appears
to me that, although the original provocation was given by the Em-
peror by siezure in time of peace of the districts of Gochelee and
Balickdoo, avowedly belonging to the King of Persia, the existing
9, Malcolm, Sir John, "Notes on Connection of Russia with Persia"
in Despatches and Correspondence of Duke of Wellington, III
,
109-110.
10 .Annual Regist8r|^1836, 384-287.
11 .State Papers, British and Foreign, Vol. I, Part I, 361-264.
Art. VI.
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hostilitisa are to be attributed to the latter." Yet Wellington
felt that they were bound to take some action on account of the
provision of the Treaty and also the fact that the Persians had
suffered because of the failure of the British to do more for them
when mediating in 1813. Furthermore, Wellington declared, "we
have a real interest in the preservation of the independence and
integrity of the Persian monarchy: It will not answer, then, to
allow the Persian monarchy to be destroyed, particularly upon a
case of which the original aggression and injustice is undoubtedly
13
on the side of the Russians. " His recommendation was to mediate
14
but not to give aid or money.
The English were not willing just then to be led into a wax
with Russia to save Persia, so they proceeded to put their own
interpretation on the Treaty and replied that since the disputed
territory was "uninhabited ground" the case was not one of "ag-
15
gression contemplated in the Treaty of Teheran."
Thus, "Persia rushed into war without a sufficient motive:
and, as she brot to it neither adequate resources, nor sufficient
preparation, she could not promise herself that the result would be
favorable. The Persian army was trained by British officers; but
when it was marched to attack the Russian frontier, the British
lo
charge' d' aiff aires forbade them to follow it," ° In the first days
13. Despatches and Correspondence . Ill , 465.
13 . Ibid. , 456.
14
.
Ibid, , 539.
15. Sykes, "History of Persia", II, 431.
16. Annual Register, 1836, 387.
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of the war the Persians were victorious but as they were left to
themselves this was soon over and by Oct. 15, 1826, the Russians
17
were winning. Success continued with the latter for over a year
when the Shah begged for peace. On Feb, 38, 1838, the Treaty of
Turkomanchai was concluded, whereby Russia gained that "for which
she would make war on all mankind, increase of territory, and
payment of her expen3es,\"^^
The settlement of the Persian War again allowed Russia to give
her undivided attention to her differences with Turkey, The rival-
ry between these two countries was evident on every hand. Vis-
count Strangford suggested early in 1828 that the "true fears of
the Turks point to Asia, their 'own soil and that of the Prophet
and the Faith*. Those fears have been powerfully excited
by the progress of the Russians on the side of Persia.
Let the Porte be assured that if she agrees to the Treaty (Of July
6, 1827) as it now stands, the Allies will be satisfied, and that
they will guarantee her Asiatic dominions from any aggression on
1 Q
the part of European Powers."
On the other hand Nicholas accused the Turks of offering aid
to the Persians in the recent conflict. So, in spite of the Treaty
of London, these inimical feelings, added to the usual hostilities,
30
resulted in a declaration of another wax on April 36, 1828.
The cunning of the Russians is obvious from the claim that this
step was not a departure from her agreement in the Alliance of
17
.
Ibid.
18 . Ibid.
,
1828, 218,
Text of Treaty in State Papers, XV, 669: Trans, in Krausse,
"Russia in Asia", App. 336-341.
19 . Despatches and Correspondence of Duke of Wellington, IV, 287,
20 • Skrine, F.H.
,
"Expansion of Russia", 106,
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1837. The English statesmen were again alarmed. Peel noted that
the Russian admirals were neutrals or belligerents just as it suit-
23
ed their purposes, and Ellenborough ivrote: "I feel very anxious
on the subject of the progress of the Russians in that quarter
(Eastern shore of Black Sea). I feel a presentiment that, step by
step as the Persian monarchy is broken up, they will extend their
influence and advance their troops till, without
quarrelling -.Tith us, they have crept on to Cabul, where they may
33
at their leisure prepare a force for the invasion of India."
As the declaration of war caused apprehension on the part of
the English, much more did the Treaty of Peace signed at Adrianople
Sept. 14, 1839. Especially Article IV by which the Porte gave
Russia all she claimed in Asiatic Turkey and Article VII giving
Russian merchant vessels free use of the Straits, were regarded
34
with deep concern. Oct, 31, 1329, the Earl of Aberdeen wrote to
Count Nesselrode pointing out how Nicholas had broken faith in mak-
ing such a treaty. Among the charges we find that his promises deny-
ing his ambition for conquest and his wish to endanger the inde-
pendence of Turkey, certainly did not correspond with his terri-
torial acquisitions, or the commercial privileges secured. He also
stated, that "the cession of the Asiatic Fortresses with their
21 Annual Register, 1338, 410. In the official declaration of war
it was stated that; "Lastly Russia though at war with the Porte,
for reasons which axe independent of the Convention of the 6th
of July, has not departed, and will not depart, from the stipu-
lations of the act. " Ibid.
23 Despatches and Correspondence of Duke of Wellington, V, 598.
33 Ibid. -VI, 100.
34 State Papers, British and Foreign,XVI, 647 ff
.
, Hertslet's "Map
of Europe by Treaty';i, 813-831; Annual Register, 1829, 475-483.
By Art. IV the Porte gave up islands of the Danubian delta to-
gether with Poti
,
Anapa, Akhalzikh and Akhalkali in Asiatic
Turkey.
o .
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neighboring districts, not only secures Russia the uninterrupted
occupation of the Eastern Coast of the Black Sea, but places her in
a situation so commanding as to control at pleasure the destiny of
35
Asia Minor.
"
One armed conflict after another is the history of the Levant
during this period. In all of these Russia keenly siezed any op-
portunity to further her policy, while her rival Great Britain was
by no means a passive spectator. In 1833, Constantinople was in
immediate danger of an attack by an army sent by Mehemet Ali of
Egypt, one of Turkey's own vassals. In his plight the Sultan turn-
ed to England. However, when the appeal came Palmer ston was un-
willing to send help lest the French should ally themselves with
36
Mehemet Ali. Besides this the British fleet was preparing to
37
blockade the coast of the Netherlands, so no aid was sent. But
just then the Tsar, not willing that any power stronger than the
Porte should rule in Constantinople, offered his assistance, which
the Sultan in his dire need could not refuse. This alliance soon
succeeded in checking the on-coming army. The European Powers were
now aroused, for with Russia as an actor the plot was decidedly
changed. The British, French, and Austrian ambassadors begged the
Sultan to offer Mehemet acceptable peace terms and arranged to
bring the British and French fleets to the Eastern Mediterranean.
38
Finally on May 15, 1333, such a settlement was reached. Concern-
ing this, Palmerston explained the policy of his nation in a letter
dated March 31, 1833. "The terms", he wrote "to be imposed on the
35. State Papers, British and Foreign XXVI, 1397-1399.
36. Phillips, W.Alison, in Cambridge Modern History X, 551.
37. Broderich and Fother ingham, 393.
38. Ibid. , 394.
i
80.
Pasha are good, inasmuch aa he does not get Damascus or Aleppo,
and 30 has not the avenues of Mesopotamia . His real de-
sign is to establish an Arabian kingdom, including all the countries
in which Arabic is the language. There might be no harm in such a
thing in itself; but as it would necessarily imply the dismember-
ment of Turkey, we could not agree to it. Besides, Turkey is as
good an occupier of the road to India as an active Arabian sovereign
would be. We must try to help the Sultan in organizing his army,
navy and finances: and if he can get those three departments in
39
good order he may still hold his ground."
Moreover, Russia's real design was manifested in the reward
claimed for her services in the Treaty of Unkiax Skelessi, July 8,
1833. Its provisions included, first, the closing of the Darda-
nelles to the Warships of other nations, and second, a defensive
alliance of Turkey and Russia that was to last eight years and then
30
to be renewed. As usual the British were displeased and the fol-
lowing word was sent to St. Petersburg, "That treaty appears to His
Majesty's Government to produce a change in the relations between
Turkey and Russia, to which other European States are entitled to
object; and the undersigned is instructed to declare that, if the
stipulations of that Treaty should hereafter lead to the armed
interference of Russia in the internal affairs of Turkey, the Brit-
ish government will hold itself at liberty to act upon such an oc-
casion, in any manner which the circumstances of the moment may ap-
pear to require, equally as if the Treaty above mentioned were not
29. Letter to Hon. Wm. Temple (British Minister at Naples) in
Bulwer's "Life of Palmerst on", II , 145.
30, State Papers, British and Foreign, XX, 1177. Articles II and
V. Hertslet's "Map of Europe by Treaty", II, 925-928.
i
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in existence .
"
In Circaasia, where the Russians were carrying on campaigns, a
minor incident took place in 1838 which served to augment further in
the minds of some Englishmen, suspicions of her rival's designs.
The Russians siezed an English merchant vessel, known as the "Vixen,"
with a cargo of salt. The charges were that the OTOer had not paid
the custom- 3 duty and also that he had brought ammunition for the
revolting Circassians. A firm denial was made of the latter charge,
and as to the former, the claim was that Russia had no authority on
32
that coast as the Circassians were independent. In the House of
Commons, Mr. Atwood asked if Russia was to receive Cir cassia as a
gift from Turkey, under the Treaty of Adrianople, after having con-
tracted with England to receive "no separate advantage" from Tur-
key. He further inquired if England was to allow Russia to exter-
minate the Circassians and thus get possession of a country which
would increase her influence in Persia and the East, or if they
33
were to endure the "arrogance" of Russia in the Vixen affair.
34
However, then as on a former occassion when Palmerston had conclud-
35
ed that the government need take no action, the matter was dropped.
As time went on the British became more and more concerned over
the Russian control of the Dardanelles. Lord Dudley Stuart declar-
ed that it affected (1) national honor, (3) naval supremacy, (3)
commercial interests, (4) English influence in Europe, and (5)
31. Bligh to ITessebrode, Oct. 39, 1833. State Papers, British and
Foreign, XXIV, 1392.
32. Annual Register, 1837, 353.
33. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, XXXVIII, 1911. July 14, lb37.
34. Ibid., 1163, June 3, 1837.
35. Ibid.
,
1913.
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security of the possessions in India. Palmerston agreed with
37
him and in June, 1838, wrote to Granville, then ambassador to Paris,
that he favored an agreement between England and FrsLnce for a limit-
ed time, to protect Turkish territory against either Nicholas or
Mehemet Ali, for he was convinced that such a plan would save Turkey
38
and the peace of Europe. Consequently in 1839, when the Turks, who
had attempted to regain Syria, were seriously defeated, the Western
Powers sent their fleets into the Dardanelles, Nicholas then saw
A
that the only way to avoid war was to take sides with the other
39
Powers. Even in doing this the Tsar resorted to a bit of diplomacy
to separate England and France. "Nor was this difficult, for while
France was anxious to make Mehemet Ali independent of the Sultan,
Great Britain was resolved to do nothing to break up the Turkish
Empire." The English were satisfied when Russia promised to annul
the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi , but the French still held their am-
40
bit ions concerning Egypt.
Palmerston urged that for the sake of England's commercial and
political interests they should decide whether the four Powers,
Austria, Prussia, Russia, and England, having failed to persuade
41
France to join them, would or would not unite to protect Turkey.
The triumph of Palmerston* s policy came in the London Treaty of July
15, 1840, whereby Turkey was put under the protectorate of Europe
42
instead of being a vassal of Russia. Thus we see that England was
willing to alienate herself from France to carry out her Eastern
3S . Ibid,, XXXI, 614. Jn House of Commons Feb. 19, 1836.
37 . Ibid. , 647.
38. Bulwer's Life of Palmerston, II, 268.
39. Skrine, F.H.
,
"Ex^oansion of Russia", 139.
40 . Ibid.
41. Letter to Hon. Viscount Melbourne in Bulwer's "Life of Palicer-
42- §la?e*Pap^rs?^firi^isK aM^^loreign, XXVIII, 342-347.
Hertslet's "Map of Europe by Treaty", II, 1008-1013.
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policy. Yet France did not care to oppose all Europe, so she
returned to the "European Concert", and on July 13, 1841, all five
Powers signed the "Convention of the Straits" which gave the Sultan
their promise to conform to the ancient Rule of the Ottoman Empire
43
in reference to the passage of the Straits.
"The Times", commenting on this arrangement, said that to have
left Russia in control of Constantinople would have been very fool-
ish^ for "our trading interests in the Levant would at once be
paralyzed by the hostile and prohibitory commercial systems of Rus-
sia; our naval influence in the Mediterranean would be opposed by
a new and ambitious power, ; our Indian empire would be
menaced, not from the distant steppes of Khiva, but by the sudden
and dreadful downfall of moral influence and the high renown of
44
England throughout the west of Asia.
"
On Russia's side we find that while the English were aroused
over her aggressions, she like her rival was bent only on carrying
out her natural policy. Whenever an opportunity presented itself,
Russia was not slow to make use of it. "There is a tide in the aS-
fairs of nations, as well as of men, and Russia surely took it at
the flood; or her course may be compared to that of the gamester,
who, finding himself in luck, stakes high and wins all. No human
45
foresight could have prepared for her such a train of success.
"
4a Ibid. , 1034-1036.
State Papers, British and Foreign, XXIX, 703-705.
"So long as the Porte is at Peace, His Highness will admit no
Foreign Ship of War into the said Straits." Art. I.
44. August 30, 1840, 4a.
45. "The Times" Jan. 9, 1839, 5d.
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Chapter IV,
THE CONTEST IN ASIA 1838-1844.
In 1838, Russia made a great advance toward the goal of her am-
bition in the Treaty of Turkomanchai. From this time she began to
dominate Persian affairs much as the great syndicate controls the
small corporation. Not only were the two Khanates, Erivan and
Nakitchevan, ceded to her with "full rights and property" and with
them the right to navigate the Caspian, but also Persia agreed to
pay a large indemnity and to allow Russia a voice as to the suc-
cession to the throne.^ True, Persia went on with her own enter-
prises and once in a while, as in the massacre of the Russian lega-
tion at Teheran in 1839, saw a vision of her former power, only to
3
have it vanish in the reparation demanded at St. Petersburg. Soon,
seeing that hostility was only a losing deal, the Shah decided to
assume an obliging attitude and thus Russia was doubly favored, as
3
this made it possible to carry out her intrigues.
Persia's would-be guardian in Western Europe was not blind to
her new domination. In 1831 Wolff, the missionary, visited Merv
and in the following year. Lieutenant Burnes came to Bokhara and
both reported that these places were "advanced posts of the panic-
4
mongers.
"
The long-distance view from. Britain gave varied notions as to
whether Russia still clung to the ajnbition for which her Emperor
had sought an alliance with Napoleon. Judging from Conolly's
1. State Papers, British and Foreign, XV, 669. Trans, in Krausse,
"Russia in Asia", App. 336-341.
3« State Papers XXVII. 8N.: Rambaud, A., "History of Russia, "II ,345.
3. Krausse, Alexis, "Russia in Asia", 113.
4. Ibid. , 323.
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"Overland Journey to India" a writer stated; "India can never be
taken by a coup-de main - and it will require a succession of years
before Russia could sufficiently advance into the 'bowels of the
land' to master any secure position from which to direct ultimate
5
operations. " Others thot there was little danger of a march on
6
India as the distance was too great and the country too barren.
Yet we have already noticed how the English zealously guarded
the Russian power in the Near East lest her way to India be cut off,
ajid that as early as 1814, the same policy was shown by Article I
in the Treatv of Friendship and Alliance between Great Britain and
7
Persia. This and other articles of the Treaty still formed the
basis of relationship between the two countries. The most striking
8
provisions cited the mutual obligations in time of war. In 1839,
to redeem herself for not aiding the Persians in their war with
Russia and to relieve Persia's dire need, England paid 300,000
9
tomauns to the Shah. who in turn annulled two articles of the
5, Quarterly Review, LII, 57.
6. Gore, Montague, Edinburgh Review, LXVIII, 537.
7, Article I. "The Persian Government judge it incumbent on them
after the conclusion of this Definite Treaty, to declare all Al-
liances contracted with European Nations in a state of hostility
with Great Britain null and void, and hold themselves bound not
to allow any European army to enter the Persian Territory, nor
to proceed toward India, nor to any of the Ports of that country;
and also not to allow any individuals of such European Nations,
entertaining a design of invading India, or being at enmity with
Great Britain, whatever, to enter Persia." State Papers, British
and Foreign, Vol.1, Part I, 363. Nov. 35, 1814.
8. -Ibid. , 363 Arts. V-IX.
9 'Webster's Dictionary gives present value of 1 tomaun as $1.78.
Formerly worth more.
This was supposed to help pay Persia's indemnity.
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Treaty.
When corporations wish to control the affairs of weaker ones a
very usual beginning is to secure control of the election or ap-
pointment of officials. We have noted that in the Treaty of 1828
there was an article whereby Russia recognized Prince Abbas Meerza
as the heir to the throne Therefore the death of that Prince
naturally attracted attention in Russia. Count NesselTode was too
wise not to realize that England was concerned in this too, so he
sent word to Viscount Palmerston that he thought it would prevent
civil war in Persia if the two nations would agree in reference to
Persia's next ruler. On June 16, 1834, Palmerston sent word to St.
Petersburg that he had communicated with Persia and now agreed that
the choice made by the Russian Envoy of MohauKmed Meerza, son of
Abbas, was agreeable to His Majesty's Government and that he thot
13
it was fortunate that they could thus agree.
We shall now investigate whether the purposes of this Anglo-
Russian concern in the Persian succession were due to general in-
la State Papers, British and Foreign I. Part I, 262. Articles
annulled were:
Art. III. "The limits of the Territory of the two States of
Russia and Persia shall be determined according to the admission
of Great Britain, Persia, and Russia."
Art. IV. If Persia were engaged in a defensive war, England
was to pay her 300,000 tomauns annually to equip the army.
11. See Note 1 above,
12. State Papers - British and Foreign, XXIII, 860.
13. Ibid. , 861.
Urquhart blamed Palmerston for acting with Russia in this and
complained that he was silent as to why England should support
a Russian candidate. This, Urquhart claim.ed, was evidence that
Palmerston was co-operating with the enemy. Urquhart, D. "Dip-
lomatic Transactions in Asia 1834-1839", 23.
Quarterly Review, LXXVII. 259. An explanation is given that
Palm.er8ton had very indiscreetly taken Urquhart into diplomatic
service at Constantinople with the result of a recall and a
personal quarrel. Also that "by dint of exaggeration of state-
ments, and misrepresentation of facts" Urquhart then tried to
prove that Palmerston was a tool of Russia and a traitor to
England,
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terests only. Herat, the chief city of Afghanistan, was then
ruled by Prince Kamran, who without acknowledging Persia's sov-
ereignty, had been paying an annual tribute to the Shah, whenever
the Governor of Khorassan, under Persia's control, was strong
enough to threaten his dominion. Just before his death. Abbas
Meerza had successfully fought in Khorassan, and advancing toward
Herat had made a contract with Kararan Meerza (1) to raze the Fort
of Ghorian, (2) to return certain families to Persia, and (3) to
pay annually 10,000 toraauns to the Shah. These requirements had
14
not been met and so when Mohammed Meerza came to the throne on
Jan. 1, 1835, anxious for military glory, it is not strange that he
was easily persuaded to carry on his father's campaign.
The English had hoped that the new ruler would desist, for the
15
British policy had been opposed to foreign aggressions by Persia.
When Mr. Ellis as minister from England arrived in Persia in 1835,
he felt a suspicion of Russia's influence, and on Nov. 13 of that
same yeax, he wrote to Palmerston; "it is unsatisfactory to know
that the Shah has very extended schemes of conquest in the direction
of Afghanistan and, in common with all his subjects, conceives that
the right of sovereignty over Herat and Kandahar is as complete now
as in the reign of the Suffavean Dynasty. This pretension is much
sustained by the success of his father, Abbas Meerza, in the
16
Khorassan campaign, and by the suggestions of Colonel Borowski.
"
Then on Jan. 8, 1836, Mr. Ellis stated that he had reliable authori-
ty that the Russian minister was urging the Shah on, so he had plead-
14« State Papers, British and Foreign, XXIII, 865.
15. Quarterly Review, LXIV, 148.
16. State Papers, British and Foreign, XXIII, 864. Colonel
Borowski was from Poland but now an officer in the Persian
army.
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ed with the Persian officials for the second time to refrain from
the attack. He reminded them that he was an official of the
Indian Board and was sure that the British Government would look
"with great dissatisfaction on the prosecution of any schemes of
„17
extended conquest in Afghanistan. The Persians asked Mr. Ellis
if he did not consider that they had a grievance against the
Afghans and he told them he did, but that the matter could be
settled without war. He suggested that if he sent an Englishman
18
to Herat the differences could be adjusted. To this the Prime
Minister consented at the time.
Meanwhile to hasten m^atters Ellis urged Prince Kamran to send a
representative to the Shah with the promise to meet without further
18
delay all his obligations. However, the English minister was ready
for the Persians to change their minds and was not surprised when
told that they would only consent to have a letter go to Herat
through Persian authorities as they did not want to appear unable
to force Prince Kajnran. Ellis agreed to this but the plan was
frustrated by Prince Kamran' s killing some Persian residents of
20
Herat and driving others out of the city. Upon this the Shah re-
marked that the English protected their individual citizens, so he
should look after his, and this was emphasized as a cause of his
expedition.
17. Ibid. The first interview had been on Dec, 30, 1835.
18. State Papers - British and l-'oreign, XXV, 1318-1219* Mr. Ellis
further writes to Palmerston: "I hope there will be less dis-
position to listen to the encour ager/ient of the Russian Minister,
now that they cannot plead the excuse of having been ignorant
of the objections entertained by the British Government."
19. Ibid. , 1831.
20. Ibid. , 1320- Mr. Ellis suggests that Kamran may have heard of a
Persian conspiracy.

29.
Shortly after this Ellis noted that the motive of the Russian
minister, who was advising the Shah, was clear, namely, that if
Herat came under Persia, a Russian consular agent could push Rus-
sian interests in all Afghanistan. Also he realized that the Rus-
sians knew that Great Britain was bound by Article IX of the Treaty
21
of Teheran not to interfere unless requested by both sides. Be-
cause of this, Mr. Ellis declared, "as long as this Treaty remains
in force, the British Government must submit to the approach of
Russian influence, through the instrumentality of Persian conquests,
22
to the very frontier of our Indian Empire." However, on June 2,
1836, Palmerston sent word to Mr. McNeill, who had succeeded Mr.
Ellis, that it was his duty to discourage foreign conquests, to
show the Shah that it was to his advantage to be friendly with his
neighbors, and to keep in mind Article IX of the Treaty of 1814,
but at the same time to tender constantly the "good offices" of
23
the British.
As to how far the Russian power was responsible for the Persian
aggressiveness is rather hard to determine. Like the English it
24
had officers in the Persian army and its minister was watching out
for Russian interests. Some evidence indicates that there was more
than a passive interest manifested by such officials. On April 13,
1836, when Mr. Ellis had called on the Governor of Khorassan, Count
21. State Papers-British and Foreign I, Part I, 263. Treaty of
1814. Art. IX: "If war should be declared between Afghanistan
and Persia, the English Government shall not interfere with
either party, unless their mediation to effect a peace shall be
solicited by both Parties."
22. Ibid. XXV, 1220.
23. Ibid. , 1231.
24. By Article V of the Treaty of 1814: If Persians wish they may
employ European officers to drill troops if they are not from
England's enemies. State Papers I, Part I, 263.
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Simonich, the Russian minister, was present. After talking about
the good road from Teheran to Herat, the Count promised that he
would accompany the Shah to Herat, I^andahar, and Cabool if his
35
health permitted and if he could go in his carriage. Again while in
a conference with Simonich a few days later the English minister
said to him: "Afghanistan must be considered as a frontier to our
Indian Empire; that no European nation had relations either com-
mercial or political with that country; and that accordingly I
could not conceive that the British Government would view, otherwise
than with jealousy, any interference, direct or indirect, in the af-
26
fairs of Afghanistan."
Simonich was then asked if the Russian government had offered
troops or other aid to the Shah. He replied that the minister at
London and St. Petersburg could answer better as the subject was
not talked of in Persia. Later he said that his purpose in going to
Herat was to give such advice to the Shah as he felt would vitally
27
help His Majesty, A suspicion of further evidence came in a report
to Mr. Ellis that the advance pay of the Persian soldiers was taken
"with the consent of the Russian Minister from the first instalment
28
of the crore
,
kept under the seals of the Minister of Foreign Af-
39
fairs and the Secretary of the Russian Missions,
"
The problem in Afghanistan concerned other cities as well as
Herat. Each had its own particular enemy and was ready to make the
alliance that would help its own interests. Uzeez Khan, a Kandahar
nobleman, told Mr. Ellis that all Afghanistan except Herat and its
25. State Papers - British and Foreign^XXV, 1224,
26. Ibid. , 1225. ^
27. Ibid.
28. Persia's debt to Russia, "Crore " is an Anglo-Indian term for ten
million.
29. Ibid. , 1228,

31.
dependencies was ready to come under feudal relations with the
Shah - their object being to protect Kandahar from Kamran Meerza
30
and the Seiks. Later Dost Mohammed, King of Cabool, appealed, by
boasting of his own military strength, to the Shah as "King of
Islam," to ally with him against their enemy on the east. At the
same time he threatened that if the Persians did not send help they
would com.bine with the English who would then get Afghanistan. The
Shah replied to this with a present of a "diamond-hilted sword" and
an explanation that the bad weather had checked their plans at
31
Herat.
After a similar appeal to St. Petersburg, Dost Mohammed asked
help of Lord Auckland who had just arrived as governor of India.
The latter answered by sending Captain Burnes on a comm.ercial mis-
33
sion to Cabool in Sept., 1837. Burnes found the Khan pretending to
be friendly but soon discovered that at the same time he was in-
timate with Persia and Russia, receiving from Captain Vicovitch
presents sent by Count Simonich. The Englishman tried to make the
33
Khan decide with whom he would cast his lot, but failed. So the
struggle went on. Those in far-off Europe realized little of the
strife but the representatives of the two great corporations and of
these smaller Asiatic com-panies could easily imagine that vast
destinies were in the balance.
Following Palmerston's instructions, Mc Neill had induced an
Envoy from Herat to write out the precise terms on which he would
make an agreemient with the Shah. Then he told the Persians that if
troops were again sent toward Herat the English government "might
30. Ibid. , 1233.
31. Ibid., 1339-1240; Letter from Dost Mohsunmed to the Shah.
33. Annual Register, 1839,LXXXI, 325.
33. Quarterly Review LXIV, 165-170.
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suspect that Persia had in view other objects than those
which she had avowed." Furthermore, "if the Ministers of this
(Persian) Court declare that their fears of sinothar Government
prevent them from acceding to the wishes of the British Government
, such a pretext would destroy the hopes of the British
Government and its hopelessness will be increased in proportion to
the weakness of Persia." The result was that the offers of Prince
Kararan were very generous but the Shah's acceptance named one con-
dition - that Herat surrender her sovereignty. This was asking too
much, and so on July 33, 1837, the Shah started to rene'^ his attack
34
on the besieged city.
Out of the peace negotiations came an incident that later de-
layed the settlement of differences between England and Persia.
When the Peace Envoy returned to Herat, Mr. Mc Neill sent Ali Mo-
hammed Beg, who had been thirty years in the English service, to
follow the Envoy and to report if he were molested. All went well
until the messenger had started back to Tehran when on Oct. 16,
1837, the caravan with which he travelled met General Borowski, who
recognized him. Soon after horsemen were sent dragging him to camp
and taking his clothes partly from him in order to get the letters
he carried. Mc Neill felt that this was a violation of the Law of
Nations and also an effort to show to the Afghan and Persian Armies
"an apparent contempt for the English. " He therefore demanded an
apology from the Persian Government and the dismissal of the Per-
sian officer who made the arrest, with the provision that he be
35
not put back until given permission by the British Government.
34. State Papers - British and Foreign, XXV, 1254-1369.
35. Ibid. , 1277-1279. From letter of Mc Neill to Palmer 3ton,Nov.
25, 1837.
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Although Mc Neill had taken this atep on his own initiative^ on Feb.
12, 1838, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs ^flrrote him that the
35
Queen's Government had approved the course he had taken.
On Oct. 10, 1837, Captain Vicovich of the Russian service and
Aid-de-Camp of the General at Orenberg passed through Nishapore on
37
hie way to Cabool and Kandahar. Much speculation was made as to
38
his real purpose. The Tsar claimed that he was a cornmercial envoy.
On Oct. 20, 1837, Mc Neill wrote to Palmerston; "I beg to say that
Vicovich had everywhere announced that he was sent to intimate the
arrival at Asterabad of a large Russian force destined to co-operate
with the Shah's army against Herat." Again on Dec. 16, he 'flrrote
that it was reported to him that Captain Vicovich said that his
Governinent intended to release Persia from her obligation to pay
the rest of the debt due her if Herat were taken, as the Emperor
40
wished to contribute that amount to the campaign. Just a short
time later the Count seemed so highly elated over the fall of
Ghorian that it was easy to believe that he was vitally interested
41
in the conquest.
On April 11, 1838, the English minister sent word to both Pal-
mer ston and LordAui&land that a treaty had been made between Kan-
dahar and the Shah by the mediation and guarantee of the Russian
minister which purported to give Herat to Kandahar if the latter
would serve the Shah "truly and faithfully. " It further provided
that agents and merchants of both Persia and Russia were to be well
36
.
Ibid. , 1289.
37. Ibid., 1276. Letter from Col. Stoddart to Mr. Mo Neill.
38* Krausse, A., "Russia in Asia", 64.
39. State Papers. British and Foreign, XXV, 1377.
40 . Ibid. , 1389.
41 . Ibid. , 1297.
•?
1
I
43 34,
treated by the Chief of Kandahar. This advantage to Russia re-
sulted from Vicovitch'3 visit, as itell as the similar alliance of
43
Kabool and Persia. Russia's influence seemed to be triumphing but
there was an important contingency - Herat had not yet been taken.
When the Shah started on his expedition to Herat, Mc Neill pur-
posely remained behind publicly to announce his opposit ion^'^to the
plan, but in May, 1838, he decided to follow in order to make anoth-
er effort toward reconciliation. On the very night of the proposed
attack on the city the Shah consented to let the English minister
make any arrangement that he saw fit. But when Mc Neill returned
with favorable terms from Prince Kamran, he found that Count Simon-
ich had arrived with a sura of money and also that the Shah had
45
changed his mind, so within a few hours the battle was on.
All summer Mc Neill watched for a chance to intercede but on
Aug. 3, 1838^he declared: "Persia has no provocation to complain of.
The course pursued by the British Government toward this Government
has been one of uniform friendship and forbearance and it appears
to me, that it would be an inefficient, as well as hazardous and
costly line of policy to adopt, were the British Government any
longer to x)3rmit Persia under shelter of her Treaty with England to
4o
open the way to India for another and far more formidable Power."
43. Ibid., XXVII, 35. Terms of Treaty on p. 113-114.
Guarantee: "I, who am the Minister-plenipotentiary of the ex-
alted Government of Russia will be a guarantee that neither on
the part of His Majesty, the Shah of Persia, nor on the part
of the powerful Sirdars shall there occur any deviation from,
or violation of this entire Treaty and these agreements."
"Count Simonich.
"
43. Ibid., 110; Indian Officer, "Russia's March Toward India," I,
99-102.
44. State Papers - British and Foreign, XXV, 1269.
45. Ibid., XXVII, 44-47. A further reason was that the Shah had a
message from Kandahar promising aid and assurance that the Af-
ghans'of Cabul or elsewhere would not relieve Herat.
46. Ibid. , 115.
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Juat a week before this was written, the Foreign Secretary had ar-
rived at the same conclusion when he instructed Mc Neill to state
to the Shah that the British Government ex]:->ected Persia to co-
operate in maintaining a defensive barrier for India, but that it
seemed "he has openly connected himself with a European Power, for
purposes avowedly unfriendly, if not absolutely hostile to British
interests" and therefore England would feel at liberty to disregard
47
the Treaty as far as her interests demanded.
It cannot be conceived that Great Britain would receive from
her ministers these reports of Russian intrigue without demanding
an explanation from St. Petersburg. In fact, early in 1337 Pal-
mer ston asked Nesselrode through the English minister at the Russiar:
capital, if Simonich was acting according to his instructions, and
48
suggested that the Government put a stop to his actions. On Feb.
24, 1837 Nesselrode replied; "if Count Simonich acted in the manner
stated by Mr. Mc Neill, he had done that which was in direct oppo-
sition to his instruct ions . The Count had been distinctly ordered
to dissuade the Shah from prosecuting the present war at any time
49
and in any circumstances." Furthermore when the head of the Easterr
Department offered to show the English minister the original book of
instructions, Durham said he did not doubt these orders but it was
to the inconvenience of the Russian Government to be represented by
a person who either "would not or could not act according to his
50
Instruct ions .
"
47. Ibid., 42. Letter dated July 27, 1838.
48. Ibid., XXV, 1234. Palmsrston to Earl Durham Jan. 16, 1S37.
49. Ibid. , Durham to Palmerston.
50. Ibid. , 1235.
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This disavowal seemed to satisfy the British Government for
over a yesir, when they awoke to the fact from the minister's reports
that Russian intrigues continued as before in Asia. So again in
November of 1833 the matter was presented to the Russian Government.
Nesselrode protested that Russia did not intend to interfere with
British possessions in Asia but he acknowledged that "Count Simonicl]
had certainly acted in a manner of which we had a right to complain;
51
and therefore that functionary had been recalled. " Again, though
Russia did not disavow the Kandahar Treaty nor the acta of her of-
53
ficers, Palmerston accepted the explanation and hoped that the mat-
53
ter was settled.
Meantime the British influence had only been losing ground in
Persia. On June 4, 1838 a memorandum of England's demands was
54
presented to the Shah. The point in reference to satisfaction over
the insult to the British messenger proved to be the stumbling
block. So on June 25, Mc Neill announced to Palmerston that be-
cause of this and his ill treatment in camp he had broken diplomatic
relations with Persia trending the Shah's meeting his terms, and on
55
Aug. 34 he received the approval of the Government. Although the
Ministry hoped that the differences would soon be adjusted, over
three years passed before reconciliation was made. Many members of
51. Ibid., XXVII, 186. Date Nov. 30, 1S38.
52. Annual Register, 1839, 336.
53. State Papers-British and Fore ign, XXVII , 184.
On April 4, 1839, Palmerston stated to the Russian Minister at
London that the British were satisfied and grateful that the
first act of Colonel Duhamel at Teheran was to recall Captain
X^'icovich from Afghanistan.
Ibid. , 194.
54. Ibid. , 93.
55. Iteid. , 103-105.

—
_
^
— _____ ^ ,
Parliament complained, as they felt that an alliance with Persia
56
was necessary for the cora.T.ercial interests of Great Britain.
When the Indian Government heard of the Shah's intention to be-
siege Herat, they sent Lieutenant Eldred Pottinger, Military Secre-
tary of the British Legation, to aid the defense of the "Key to
57
India." With his leadership the city of Herat was able to withstanc
58
the siege, which the Persians gave up on Sept. 9, 1838. Lord Auck-
land, however, had become greatly alarmed over these Persian ag-
gressions. From the reports that came to him it was easy to im-
5S
agine that the Russian hosts would soon be at the frontier of India.
So lest Herat, then Kabool and Kandahar get into Persia's hands
and ultimately into Russia's, and also to thwart rumors of a Moslem
invasion into India, Lord Auckland, in 1838 decided to promote
against Dost Mohammed the claims of one more pretender, the exiled
ruler Shah Shuja. Although successful at first. Shah Shuja was not
popular, and besides, the British army lacked reinforcements. So
after a two year military regime, a general insurrection at Kabul
in 1843 restored the former ruler. "The first Afghan enterprise,
b^enin in a spirit of aggression, and conducted amid disagreements
^ 60
and mismanagement, had ended in the disgrace of British arms."
Just as the British were active in Afghanistan during this
period, Russia, "while playing the part of adviser behind the
scenes, had not neglected either her interests or her opportunities'!
56 .Hansard's Parliamentary Debates: LII, 345; LIV, 74; LVI , 374,
766ff
.
"Then, too, just at this time a gigantic operation be-
yond the Indus needed our help in Persia. One of the many
grounds on which the expedition was undertaken was to meet cer-
tain assumed dangers arising out of alleged intrigues and
designs on the part of Russia." Earl of Ripon: LVI, 767.
57 .State Papers - British and Foreign, XXV, 1378.
58 . Ibid. , XXVII , 125.
59 .Lord Auckland's Reoort to the Secret Committee. In Muir's
"Making of I ndia, "' 317-319.
60 .Hunter, Sir W.W. , J'The Indian Empire", 478-479. _
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In 1838 or 1839 (the exact -Deriod is not known) Russia had occupied
61
the island of Ashurada in the Caspian off Astrabad, Moreover, on
June 18, 1839, General Pervoski was despatched from Orenburg toward
Khiva in order to release some Russian subjects from prison and
also to establish trade relationships. He found many obstacles.
The intense heat and scarcity of water caused so much delay at
first that winter snows hindered them before reaching their destina-
tion. In desperation, Perovski turned back with his few survivors.
As soon as he reached Orenburg he learned that an Englishman, Cap-
tain Abbot, had been at Khiva and by diplomacy had released the Rus-
63
sian prisoners.
On the face of this account it seems that the English were work-
ing for the welfare of their rival. The Edinburgh Review explained
the circumstance in this way. After the relief of Herat certain
Englishmen decided to go to Central Asia to learn the real situation,
They were aware that an extensive slave traffic in Russian and Per-
sian subjects was carried on there, and reasoned that as the English
were trying to establish themselves in Afghanistan it was well to
be sure that these states were secure from foreign aggression and
therefore it was not wise for them to hold in bondage subjects of
near-by governments. Thus the "dictates of humanity and of prudent
63
policy" alike sent the independent mission to the Khanates.
As soon as the Bokharian Amir learned of the British defeat
in Afghanistan he no longer treated their envoys so well. For
sometime he had been suspicious that they had caused the Khokan-
61 .Krausse, Alexis, "Russia in Asia", 113.
62 • Ibid. , ,63-54.
63 • July 1845. Vol. 83, pp. 136-137. This same explanation is ex-
pressed by "An Indian Officer" in "Russia's March Toward India"
I, 133.
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dians to attack him and he then took revenge by putting two of
64
them, Stoddaxt and ConoUy, to death on June 34, 1843. It has
been said of them that they "went cheerfully into unknown lands and
there laid do'.vn their lives in their endeavor to add to the glory
of their dearly-loved country and to thwart the designs of England's
65
enemies.
"
Perovski's failure did not stop the activity of the Czar. Per-
sistent communications were maintained with Khiva until in 1843
they were able to make a treaty whereby the Khan promised "never to
engage in hostilities against Russia or to permit acts of robbery
65
to go unpunished. "
Russia's encroachments were so remote from England that very
little was known concerning them. When on Aug. 6, 1840, Mr. Hume
asked in the House of Commons if the report of Russia's expedition
asainst Khiva were true, the reply was that it was, "improbable,
67
unless troops and cannon had dropped down from the skies. " That
no nation-wide rivalry existed is also shown by the royal reception
68
given Tsar Nicholas when he visited London in 1844. He had, how-
ever, on this visit several conversations with the prominent states-'
69
men relative to Anglo-Rusaian affairs both in Turkey and in Central
Asia. As to the latter section it was finally agreed "to leave
the Khanates of Central Asia to serve as a neutral zone interposed
between Russia and India, so as to preserve them from dangerous
70
contact.
64. An Indian Officer, "Russia's March on India", I, 136.
65. Ibid. , 137.
66. Krausge, A., "Russia in Asia", 65.
67. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, LV, 1365.
68. Irving, Joseph, "Annals of Our Time", June 1, 1844, P. 71.
69. Ibid. Duke of Wellington, Earl of Aberdeen and Sir Robert Peel.
Palmer st on avoided the Tsar.
70. Krausse, A., "Russia in Asia", 66.

Chapter V.
ANGLO-RUSSIAN RIVALRY OVER ASIATIC POSSESSIONS, 1844-1854.
"The Convention of the Straits" served its purj^ose by ensuring
comparative quiet in the Near East for over a decade. Added to
this was a memorandum issued by the Russian Government in 1844,
purporting to state that for the maintenance of the balance of
power in Europe, England and Russia should agree not to interfere
1
with the Ottoman Porte, But by 1849 clouds, "scarcely larger than
a man's hand, arose in the East" foretelling a coming conflict.
Problems had arisen between France and Turkey over their respec-
tive rights in the Holy Places. As usual, Russia was aroused over
the activity of this Western Power at her gate. Eaxly in 1853
the Tsar told Sir Hamilton Seymour, the British ambassador at
St. Petersburg, that he considered the Turk to be "very sick" and
that his Empire was falling to pieces. He then suggested that Eng-
land and Russia should arrange to act together. But Nicholas
could not get the English to move. They admitted that the Turk
3
was a "sick man
"^
but they believed he would recover.
Meanwhile as protector of the Greek Church, the ambitious Em-
peror planned a definite course of action for himself -which in-
cluded the sending of the Russian army and navy into Turkish terri-
tory. Had Palmerston been at the head of Foreign Affairs, this
4
probably would have been considered an act of war; but under the
influence of the pacifist Aberdeen, the British Cabinet took no
definite action except to send Stratford de Redcliffe to Constan-
tinople. Very soon this charge'' d' affaires became chief adviser
1 .-Annual Register, 1854, 482-483.
3 .Walpole, Spencer - "History of England", VI, 1-4.
3 . Ibid. , 7-10.
4. Skrine, F.H.
, "The Exipansion of Russia", 150-151.
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to the Sultan and hia in.fluence together with the popular senti-
ment in England forced the Government to take action. On March 12,
1854, an alliance was made with Turkey and on the 87th following,
a formal declaration made Great Britain, along with France, a par-
5
ticipant in the Cfimean Ifar.
The question arises as to why general feeling in Christian
England should favor the backing of a Mussulman State. Indeed, it
was rather difficult at first for England and France to assign
6
reasons formally for their steps. Kinglake, in a work published
soon after the Crimean War, described England's attitude as siirply
following what he termed "The Usage." "In Europe" he stated, "all
States except the five great Powers are exempt from the duty of
watching over the general safety; and even a State which is one of
the five Great Powers is not practically under an obligation to
sustain the cause of justice unless its perception of the wrong is
re-inforced by a sense of its own interests. Moreover, no State
unless it is combating for its very life, can be expected to en-
gage in a war without a fair prospect of success. But when three
circumstances are present - when a wrong is being done against
any State great or small, when that in its present or ulterior
consequence happens to be injurious to one of the five Great Pow-
ers and, finally, when the graat Power so injured is competent to
wage war with fair hopes - then Europe is accustomed to expect that
the Great Power which is sustaining the hurt will be enlivened by
the smart of the wound, and for its own sake, as well as for public
weal, will come forward in arms, or labor for the formation of such
leagues
5. Ibid., 153-lo4. ^ . _^ „
6. Kinglake, A.W., "Invasion of the Crimea, II, ^
.

— ? 43r
as may be needed for upholding the cause of justice."
What then waa the "wound" that caused Great Britain to be so
uncomfortable? Doubtless, rr.any and varied injuries combined to
8
make Liberals and Conservatives, in fact all except the Ministry,
ready to fight the Russians. But aiiiong them we find that fear of
losing their Asiatic possessions as well as the control of the
buffer States caused the Anglo-Saxons much unrest. Indeed, the
same policy that had governed the English in former struggles in
the Levant still prevailed; namely that "the safety and the policy
of all Europe require a barrier against Russia; and it is a maxim
of permanent interest to the British Empire that she should not ex-
tend her territorial jurisdiction over the East, or acquire a
maritime power continually threatening the Mediterranean States
9
and the road to India.
"
Again, at a public meeting at Leicester, held to discuss the
"Turkish Question", it was declared that the Russian fleet was not
to be feared so much as their armies, for if Russia conquered Tur-
key she could then conquer Persia and threaten the Indian posses-
10
sions. Furthermore, a London editor, referring to the noticeable
results of Russia's aggressions in Europe, said, "the same poli-
cies are pursued with equal activity in Asia and there it is ob-
viously directed against the interests of the British Empire.
Persia has fallen under her yoke . In Afghanistan we hear
of a renewal of the intrigues of 1838, with which we had to con-
tend when first we encountered the hostility of Russia in Central
7. "The Invasion of the Crimea^ I, S2. Published in 1863.
8. Walpole, Spencer, "History of England VI, 16.
9. Michelsen, E.H. , "The Ottoman Empire and Its Resources", in
Edinburgh Revie'^, XCIX, 305.
10. "The Times" Oct. 6, 1853, 8c.
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Asia, and even the distant expedition to Khiva is reported to be
11
renewed. "
Reviewing the events in Central Asia during this period we see
that the agreement of 1S44 seemed to check open hostilities for
some time. Another factor tending to stop the strife was the ac-
cession in 1848 of a Persian ruler whose Prime Minister, Amir Ni-
zam, strove to keep clear of both English and Russian influences;
and when he was compelled to grant rights to either, gave equal
13
privileges to the other in order to remain independent. Yet,
just the same, slowly but surely the Slavic host advanced into
Turkestan. To the strongholds already held both west and east of
the Caspian, they added one at Aralsk in 1848, two in the region
just south in 1849, and by 18 53 Fort Perovski marked the important
13
position of Ak Musjid on the Syr Darya river.
Moreover, in her relations with China, Russia had been more
fortunate than her rival. Back in 1827 Nicholas had gained by
treaty "the right to establish at Pekin a place of education,
where young men might study the language and customs of China.
"
Furthermore he had been very careful not to allow his subjects to
I4
enter extensively into the opium traffic, while trade disputes
over this commodity cost England a two years' war with the Celes-
15
tial Empire and the ill-will of that nation. Then in 1852, Russia
was able to arrange a commercial treaty with the Chinese which not
only opened a market on the Irtych but brought them nearer to Cen-
16
tral Asia. Still other advantages were seized by the Russians^ sucl
11. Ibid., Dec. 2S, 1853, 6b.
12. Krausse, Alexis, "Russia in Asia", 115.
13. Ibid. , 66.
14. Rambaud, A., "The History of Russia", II, 349.
15. Low and Sanders, "Reign of Queen Victoria", 40. The Opium ?Jar
was fought in 1840-1842.
16- Rambaud, A., "The History of Europe", II, 350.
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as the smuggling of goods across the long Chinese frontier, and
the securing of a monopoly of "brick tea" much demanded "by the
17
tribes of Western Asia. By using these advantages, legal or il-
legal, the Russians were able to establish themselves on the Amur
18
and to lay a solid foundation for their Empire in the East.
While the British boasted in all their diplomacy up to the
Afghan struggle that they were trying only to defend their posses-
sions, we now find that they, too, were assuming an aggressive
line of action; annexing Sind in 1843, a tract between the Sutlej
and the Beas together with Lahore in 1845, the Punjab in 1849, and
19
Burma in 1853.
And 30 with little conflict , Russia in Northern Asia and Great
Britain in the South were each adding territory and gaining in-
fluence wherever and whenever they were able. This of course
could not go on indefinitely without their coming into contact with
each other. The cessation of open rivalry was partly effected
when Amir Nizam, who had stood for strict Persian neutrality, was
condem.ned to death by the jealous Shah in 1853. About this time
Said Mahomed succeeded to the Afghan throne, and finding himself
unpopular, offered to ally himself with the Persians. This re-
called the situation of 1838, smd both St. Petersburg and India
30
were aroused. For the moment at least, Great Britain gained her
point by compelling Persia in 1853 to agree to a Convention where-
by she was not to send troops to Herat unless that city was invad-
17. Edinburgh Review XCVIII, 108n.
18. Skrine, F.H. , "Thb Expansion of Russia", 132.
19. Hunter, Sir W.W. , "The Indian Empire", 478-479.
30, Krausse, A., "Russian Asia", 115.
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ed by am army from the direction of Cabul or Candahar. Further-
more, whenever the foreigners went back to their own territory, the
Persian troops were to return at once to Persian soil. That same
year the entire attention of these two rivals was centered in the
Crimean War and this necessarily produced an interval in, though
it did not bring to an end, the Anglo-Russian contention in Asia.
21. State Papers - British and Foreign, XLV, 726-729.
This agreement was broken by Persia in 1855.

Conclusion.
Rivalry in the sense of open warfare, we have found, did not
exist in Asia between the Slavs and Anglo-Baxcns before the Cri-
mean War. Yet from the time of Peter the Great the Russians were
constantly endeavoring to make their way across Asia in the di-
rection of India, and just as steadfastly were the British trying
to check this advance.
Russia's first gains resulted from her desire to continue the
aggressive policy whereby she threw off the Tartar influences.
Soon her anibition knew no bounds and was ready to sieze every op-
portunity that presented itself. When Napoleon strove to reach
India the Russians were ready to go with him. If there seemed to
be a chance to conquer Turkey, Persia, or other intervening States
she did not halt at a declaration of war; or when these weaker
States were in trouble, Russia was ready to ally with them, hoping
to gain from the obligations thereby created.
It was clearly economic aspirations that led the English to
establish themselves in India and to defend in the Levant the
highway thither. For a long time the events in Asia, being so far
from the homeland, attracted little attention. But the statesmen
who were kept constantly informed by representatives in the far-
off lands and travellers in those parts finally opened the public
mind to the real situation. The English policy appeared to be to
extend as far as possible her own power in India proper, and then
to keep Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan as independent buffer
States; or else to bring them under British domination, thus pro-
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tecting her direct possessions from the danger of a Russian in-
vasion.
And so it seemed inevitable that the two great Powers, with
such persistent ambitions, should come into conflict. Nor perhaps
is one to be blamed more than the other. Russia certainly had as
much right to extend her territory in Northern Asia as Great
Britain had to gain control in the South. On this point T^e quote
from an English writer in the Quarterly Review of 1840. "Have
those gentlemen, who are so indignant with the Russian invasion of
Circassia and Khiva, not heard of our operations in Cabool and
Afghanistan? Do those who complain so loudly of finding Russian
agents at the court of Persia forget that they were so found by
British agents sent on a similar errand?
The plain truth is that whenever, from, local cir- '
cumstances, civilization comes in contact with barbarism, war in-
evitably ensues, and civilization thinks it is justified, and in
some cases is really forced in self defense, to make successive
acquisitions of territory; and when two Powers have begun like
England and Russia, on opposite sides of a great cake, like Cen-
tral India and have eaten their way into the vicinity of each
other, there will be jealousy and apprehensions, and each will be
inclined to think the other an' interloper who is, in fact only an
•imitator! Let us be assured that such results,
though they may be modified, delayed, or accelerated by the ac-
cident of moderation or ambition in individual rulers, are essen-
tially attributable not to the wiles or weakness of a Nesselrode
or a Palmerston but to the necessity of things and to the passions
1
and interests implanted in human nature."
1 Vol. , LXVII . 360-861.
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